The Dilemma of the Final Rest. An Analysis of the Failed Experience of the Nuclear Repository in Gastre (1979-1997).

Abstract

In the late 1970s, the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) conceptualized the inaugural project for the permanent and centralized storage of high-level radioactive waste. Following international guidelines, this endeavor was intended to be nestled within deep geological formations. Integral to the Nuclear Plan of 1979, an extensive program geared towards enhancing nuclear energy exploitation through various initiatives, one key facet involved the installation of four additional Nuclear Power Plants alongside the two pre-existing ones.

By 1982, the CNEA had pinpointed Gastre, Chubut, as the designated locale for the repository. However, despite the selection, the project remained a mere blueprint, and following a widespread public mobilization, it was definitively abandoned in 1997. Notably, no other nuclear nations had experienced successful implementations of such repositories by that time.

This study endeavors to offer a preliminary exploration of the subject, drawing from official documents, journalistic sources, and periodic publications. The objective is to scrutinize the project's characteristics through the lens of economic history, unraveling its narrative from 1979 to 1997. As a working hypothesis, we posit that the project's failure can be attributed to the financial and institutional challenges confronted by the CNEA from 1982 onwards, exerting a defining influence on the realization of the Gastre project. A secondary proposition suggests that, starting from the early 1990s, the CNEA underwent a gradual process of disintegration and 'dismantling,' eroding its operational capacity to sustain ambitious projects in the long term. Ultimately, the absence of a well-devised institutional communication strategy emerged as a decisive factor in fomenting opposition among the local populace